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The Electronic Medical Record (EMR) integrates 
heterogeneous information within a Healthcare 
Institution stressing the need for security and access 
control. The Biostatistics and Medical Informatics 
Department from Porto Faculty of Medicine has 
recently implemented a Virtual EMR (VEMR) in order 
to integrate patient information and clinical reports 
within a university hospital. With more than 500 
medical doctors using the system on a daily basis, an 
access control policy and model were implemented. 
However, the healthcare environment has 
unanticipated situations (i.e. emergency situations) 
where access to information is essential. Most 
traditional policies do not allow for overriding. A 
policy that allows for “Break-The-Glass (BTG)” was 
implemented in order to override access control whilst 
providing for non-repudiation mechanisms for its 
usage. The policy was easily integrated within the 
model confirming its modularity and the fact that user 
intervention in defining security procedures is crucial 





The integration of heterogeneous information 
scattered over different places is one of the main goals 
of Electronic Medical Records (EMR) [1]. This is why 
the EMR is becoming an essential source of 
information and a very important support tool for the 
healthcare professional. The distributed nature of the 
information, stresses the need for security requirements 
to be taken very seriously [2]. 
One of these requirements, access control, is the 
baseline for information security [3] allowing users to 
interact and use resources of a system. In the case of 
healthcare, authorisation procedures cannot be 
organized at a user level anymore, but need to be 
tackled in a hybrid approach. A series of structured 
and formal policies, models and roles must be defined 
[4]. 
The Biostatistics and Medical Informatics 
Department from the Faculty of Medicine of the 
University of Porto has recently implemented a Virtual 
EMR (VEMR) in order to integrate patient information 
and clinical reports from departments scattered around 
a University Hospital, Hospital S. João in Porto, 
Portugal [5]. With more than 500 medical doctors 
using the system on a daily basis, a proper policy and 
access control model were required in order to manage 
and monitor accesses to the system [6]. 
For traditional access control models there is 
usually an assumption that access permissions are 
known in advance, but in a real environment 
unanticipated situations may occur and there may be 
the need to be flexible because it is impossible to 
predict all cases [7]. Since a patient’s health is 
paramount, it is important to be able to override the 
access permissions when a patient’s health is at risk. 
In such cases as these, a Break The Glass (BTG) 
policy can be used in order to break or override the 
access controls in a controlled manner. This concept is 
not new, it has been studied and introduced in several 
domains [7] [8]. 
Not only does it relate to Healthcare [9] but also to 
other domains where access to information needs to be 
provided in certain emergency or specifically defined 
situations.  
In the case study described in this paper, the 
concept of Break the glass is innovative because it is 
being implemented within a specific access control 
policy and model that are already in place, and the 
characteristics of BTG were defined by the healthcare 
professionals who are the end users of the system.   
The BTG policy should allow a user to override the 
rules stated by the access control model and access 
what he requests, although he was not previously 
authorized to do it. But in so doing, other BTG rules 
come into play which may monitor, record or report 
the user’s actions, thus making him responsible for his 
actions after the fact. 
The main objective of this paper is to describe the 
design and initial implementation of a BTG policy in 
the VEMR system, integrated within the access control 
model already in use.  
Further, it presents the issues involved and specific 
requirements in terms of organizational and human 
processes that are needed in order to enforce the BTG 
rules. 
 
2. Access Control Model 
 
In order to provide access in a controlled manner 
there is the need for a formal definition, at an 
organizational level, of access rights according to 
roles, tasks and other specificities of the Institution. 
This should be stated within an access control policy 
that expresses the procedures, processes and needs of 
an organization.  
The rules of this access control policy were specified 
by the Security Commission within the Hospital, and 
are as follows:  
 
User’s roles, permissions and access levels  
1. medical doctors must be able to access 
information about all the patients, except for 
more sensitive information (i.e. HIV or cancer 
results); 
2. appointed medical doctors may have access to 
restricted and more sensitive information, such 
as in 1, (this is defined on a case-by-case basis); 
3. medical doctors must be able to add notes and 
comments relating to the information they are 
accessing, and view each others’ notes; 
4. nurses must have read access to the EPR of the 
patients registered within their department; 
5. healthcare researchers may have temporary 
access to the system for R&D purposes; 
6. there is a different login that is restricted and 
used only for educational purposes (i.e. to learn 
how to use the system); 
7. administrative staff have no access to the system 
at present; 
8. only a few defined IT professionals have full 




a) all users of the system must be uniquely 
identified; 
b) auditing and monitoring mechanisms have to be 
in place at all times, for all users; 
c) administrative information about the users of the 
system has to be regularly updated; 
d) break-the-glass mechanisms must be 
implemented so that people can access 
information for which they are not authorized to 
access (especially in cases of emergency or 
system error); users must be warned beforehand 
of what they are doing and a notification must 
be sent to his/her responsible superior. 
 
The model implemented [6] (Figure 1) is hybrid in 
the way that it uses both Role-Based Access Control 
(RBAC) [10] and Identity-Based Access Control 
(IBAC) [11] models in order to represent the access 




Figure 1. Entity-Relationship model 
 
RBAC helps mapping generic actions and resources 
to groups of users, or the roles the users have within 
the Organization, allowing for easier management and 
implementation. Each resource has associated several 
actions and access levels for each action. According to 
what is defined for each role, a user profile is then 
collected each time a user tries to access the system. A 
user can have associated more than one role, and will 
inherit the privileges of all of them. The model is also 
divided in projects in the way that each project can 
have users associated to different roles, groups and 
resources. 
IBAC is a Discretionary Access Control model, 
where the access control decisions are made according 
to the identity of the individual rather than the role he 
belongs to. This model allows for better granularity 
and is useful to create the exception rules specified 
within the policy, for instance as the one specified in 
item 2 above. This item says that only some specific 
doctors can access more sensitive information. This 
means that the role doctor has associated a set of 
generic privileges that do not include access to illness 
results such as cancer or HIV. A set of exception rules 
must be attributed separately to these users and, in this 
case, the users are the doctors that may have access to 
this type of sensitive information. The exceptions can 
add or take away privileges from the generic ones that 
are inherited by the user’s roles. 
The access control model was then implemented 
using a relational database system where all relations 
between the entities can be better described and in a 
modular way. To perform access control a centralized 
procedure is used. This procedure checks the roles to 
which users belong and collects resources, actions and 
access levels for those resources. It also intercepts the 
exception rules that user may have and, finally, returns 
to the user his/her complete authorization profile. 
In order to associate resources and actions to roles 
and projects, a management tool was developed. This 
tool allows the administrator of a certain project to 
associate the roles and access permissions (including 
exceptions) for each user that he is responsible for. It is 
sufficiently generic and modular since it can be used 





Figure 2 . Management tool for the model 
 
Having a model with these unique characteristics 
allows it to be flexible and modular and therefore, easy 
to add on other components. 
3. The Break The Glass Policy 
 
Traditional access control policies are usually very 
restrictive. The assumption is that users do not want to 
follow the rules, but rather would prefer to have 
unrestricted access to everything. Consequently, 
implementations focus mainly on avoiding and 
reacting to security breaches and not serving the user’s 
needs and purposes. 
As part of the access control policy stated in the 
previous section, BTG was included as a specific 
requirement defined by the healthcare professionals. 
This can be justified because there are situations when 
access is required, even if it means that patient 
confidentiality needs to be breached. The important 
issue is that this breach is known by the responsible 
parties and that the access is properly analysed 
afterwards. Then it can be considered whether the 
breach was well justified or was an intrusion.   
With all these issues in mind, it was decided that 
policies with maximum freedom of access and, at the 
same time, maximum responsibility for any 
exceptional actions taken, are preferable to traditional 
ones. 
 
Maximum freedom: the system must provide 
mechanisms for the users to access the requested 
information at all times, whenever it is needed.  
 
Maximum responsibility: the system must provide 
mechanisms to show the user (who takes an 
exceptional action) an alert message making him aware 
that he is trying to access information he is not 
authorized to see. This makes him responsible for what 
he is doing and all the actions he may take afterwards; 
the system must provide mechanisms to notify all 
responsible parties and these notifications must be 
automatic. Note that such a mechanism requires a 
definition of the responsibility hierarchy for each 
department. 
In the case of the VEMR system, users can search 
for information using the patient’s process number. 
When they ask for information about a specific patient 
that they are not authorised to access, there is the need 
to verify whether the user is intending to break the 
glass by accessing information he is not authorized to.  
The following are the steps needed in order to 
implement the BTG policy:  
 
1. the user is authorized to access the system and 
then searches for information about a specific 
patient;  
 
2. the authorization model verifies whether the user 
has access to the requested information;  
 
3. the model returns yes or no according to the user 
profile; if it returns no, it shows the user that he 
can still access the requested information, by 
breaking the glass, but knowing that all his 
actions will be recorded and that non-repudiation 
mechanisms are in place (Figure 3);  
 
4. the system is frozen until the user agrees or not 
with breaking the glass, and chooses a reason for 
doing it;  
 
5. if the user breaks the glass the hierarchy model 
verifies who it needs to notify and proceeds with 
it;  
 
6. all notifications and user actions are registered 
automatically. 
 




Figure 3. Break the Glass process. 
 
In terms of implementation, the process of 
searching for information about a patient needs to be 
complemented with an underlying request to the 
authorization infrastructure about the user’s 
permissions. This is done with a procedure that checks 
the user’s profile and the department where he works, 
and then decides to raise the BTG or not, depending 
upon whether access is denied or not.  
There was no need to change the access control 
model implementation, but only to add some more 
information about departments and hierarchical 
relations when implementing BTG.  
This was done by adding to the Entity-Relationship 
model (figure 1) one entity that related departments 
with users, and one that checked whether a department 
within the hospital uses the VEMR system.  
Another important entity added was the one that 
described the hierarchical relations between the 
healthcare staff for each department, with information 
of the superior hierarchies as well as contact 
information for every one. 
Finally, for the successful implementation of BTG, 
there is the need to implement proper tools to manage 
all the notifications in order for the non-repudiation 
service to fully work. This still needs to be finalized 
and properly tested. 
These last features are very important, but also 
complex because they interfere with the organization’s 
human processes and resources. Nevertheless, they are 
essential and allow for the policy verification, 




The BTG policy described in this paper was 
devised and developed according to the requirements 
for the environment in which it is being applied. There 
was a specific definition in the access control policy, 
by the security commission, that overriding rules 
should be provided. 
However, what in theory may seem quite 
attainable, may not actually be so when the tests start 
within a real environment. Unfortunately, the full set 
of tests are not available because the policy has not yet 
been fully implemented in the real system. Due to 
institutional constraints that still need to be overcome, 
the nurses are not yet using the system, only doctors 
can access the VEMR.  
Nevertheless, there are already some issues that 
need to be discussed. 
The BTG policy, if well structured and 
complemented with a set of mechanisms providing for 
non-repudiation (responsibility and notification), can 
be a simple solution to a very important problem in 
access control. After spending some time in a health 
care Institution we realized that this solution is 
sometimes used traditionally without the important 
characteristic of non-repudiation. The traditional break 
the glass/door policy in use allows a professional to 
have access to unauthorised information, by entering 
the medical records’ room, and seeing whatever is 
there without any kind of restriction. The only way this 
professional can be punished is if someone sees him, 
and thinks that his behaviour is suspicious 
 Being implemented within a flexible and modular 
model, the BTG policy facilitated the integration and 
use of non-repudiation mechanisms.  
It was possible to enlarge the model and adapt its 
infrastructure accordingly without much effort, so that 
additional features could be added. In some ways, this 
implementation helps to verify the policy and the 
model’s flexibility and correctness. 
Further work needs to be done concerning the 
definition and implementation of software to manage 
and update the hierarchical structure in an easy way. 
This is not trivial in a complex healthcare institution 
where people change their roles and departments quite 
often. Work still needs to be done in making sure the 
hierarchical structure in use is the most appropriate and 
correct one. 
Another important concern that needs to be tackled 
when the BTG policy starts to be used in the real 
setting is when and how this policy should be 
available. Should it be opened to everyone accessing 
the system, regardless of their role, and should the 
non-repudiation mechanisms always be switched on? 
What if these non-repudiation mechanisms do not 
work because managers receive too many notifications 
and they do not even bother to check them? How are 
disciplinary actions to be applied and will they be 
defined according to the security breach level? 
A balance must be found in all of this. The requests 
and successful break the glass attempts must be 
reduced to a minimum and under well justified 
situations. This must be tested properly before the 
policy is rolled out in a larger scale. 
Finally, and as always, security is about human 
processes as well as technology. This is why the most 
difficult parts to implement are often not the 
technological ones but the ones related to people’s 
processes and organizational structures. 
The fact that the BTG policy was defined by the 
interested parties, and the model adapted to the unique 
characteristics of the VEMR system, within a complex 
healthcare institution, resulted in a complex but 
flexible infrastructure with simple functionalities and 
tools. 
User intervention in the design and implementation 
of security policies and procedures is very important to 
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